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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-2614 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DOROTHY ROBINSON,  
a/k/a Mae-Mae, a/k/a Dorothy Johnson 
 
          Dorothy Robinson,  
                                       Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 4-07-cr-00389-010) 
District Judge:  Honorable James M. Munley  
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2013 
____________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SLOVITER and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 31, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Dorothy Robinson pleaded guilty on September 3, 2009 to the distribution of 
crack cocaine within 1000 feet of public housing in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) 
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and 860(a).  On December 1, 2011, Robinson filed a pro se motion to defer payment of a 
$1000 fine imposed as part of her sentence until after her release from prison.  The 
District Court denied this motion and Robinson now appeals.  We will affirm.   
I. 
 Robinson entered into a plea agreement pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) 
in which she agreed to plead guilty to the distribution of crack cocaine within 1000 feet 
of public housing in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 860(a).  The agreement 
provided, inter alia, that a fine in an amount to be determined by the court would be 
imposed.  Following Robinson’s guilty plea, the District Court sentenced her to 216 
months’ imprisonment and imposed a fine of $1000.  With respect to payment of the fine, 
the Court directed as follows: 
During the term of imprisonment, the fine is payable every three months in 
an amount after a telephone allowance equal to 50 percent of the funds 
deposited into the Defendant’s inmate trust fund account.  In the event the 
fine is not paid in full, prior to the commencement of supervised release, 
the Defendant shall, as a condition of supervised release, satisfy the amount 
due in monthly installments of no less than 50 dollars to commence 30 days 
after release from confinement.     
 
A. 54. 
Robinson filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea the next day, a motion the 
District Court denied.  We affirmed on May 11, 2011.  United States v. Robinson, 427 F. 
App’x 163 (3d Cir. 2011).  Following her direct appeal, Robinson filed a litany of pro se 
motions seeking various relief, including one styled as a “Petition For Fines to be 
Deferred Until Release” and several addenda thereto.  A. 67-78.  In her submission, 
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Robinson noted that she makes only $5.25 per month for her work at the prison and 
would therefore have to impose upon family members for assistance in meeting her 
payment obligations.  Due to her alleged inability to meet these obligations, Robinson 
requested that payment be deferred until her release from prison.  The Court denied the 
petition in an order dated May 11, 2012, and Robinson appeals. 
II.
1
 
 Section 3572(d)(3) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 permits a district court, 
upon motion by either party, to “adjust the payment schedule, or require immediate 
payment in full, as the interests of justice require,” if there is a “material change in the 
defendant’s economic circumstances that might affect the defendant’s ability to pay the 
fine.”  Robinson contends that the District Court erred by failing to address more 
thoroughly her claim that a change in her financial circumstances as a result of  her 
incarceration made a change in her fine payment schedule necessary.  Because 
Robinson’s motion to defer payment is entirely without merit, we disagree. 
 Robinson failed to make any showing that there has been a “material change” in 
her “economic circumstances” meriting the relief requested.  To the contrary, the District 
Court contemplated Robinson’s incarceration and inability to earn a significant sum of 
money when it crafted its adjustable fine payment schedule.  The requirement that 
Robinson pay, minus her telephone allowance, “50 percent of the funds deposited into 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction to determine Robinson’s post-judgment motion to 
alter or amend her fine payment schedule due to a change in financial circumstances 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3572(d)(3).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.      
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[her] inmate trust fund account,” takes into consideration any fluctuations in her prison 
salary, and, even, the possibility of no salary.  In the event Robinson were to receive 
insufficient funds from her prison salary or fail to receive any financial assistance from 
family members, the periodic fine payment requirement is adjusted to reflect her means.  
Accordingly, the Court properly denied Robinson’s motion to alter the fine payment 
schedule.
2
 
III. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the order of the District Court.   
 
 
                                                 
2
 There are several references in Robinson’s pro se submissions to the District Court 
indicating her dissatisfaction with the Bureau of Prison’s collection of her fine payments 
pursuant to the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”).  A. 73-75.  To the 
extent that Robinson challenges the BOP’s implementation of the IFRP as to her fine, the 
proper vehicle for such a challenge is a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed in 
the district in which she is serving her sentence.  See McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 
937 (3d Cir. 2010).    
